1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	YATRAM INDERGIT ON BEHALF OF	
4	HIMSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, JOSE	
5	FERMIN, CONSOLIDATED PLAINTIFF, ET AL.,	
6	Plaintiffs,	
7	v.	08 CV 9361 (JPO)
8	RITE AID CORPORATION, ET AL.,	
9	Defendants.	
10	x	New York, N.Y.
11		July 9, 2013 11:44 a.m.
12	Before:	
13	HON. J. PAUL O	ETKEN
14		District Judge
15	APPEARANCE.	S
16	VALLI KANE & VAGNINI LLP	
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(In open court; case called)

THE COURT: Good morning. Here we have crossmotions, I believe. There's a motion -- well this case involves store managers of Rite Aid. And we have a motion for class certification and a motion to decertify with respect to the FLSA collective action, I believe.

So on this one I guess we have crossmotions so why don't we start with plaintiffs, if that's okay.

MR. VALLI: That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I'm going to ask you if you could start with a little factual background if you could tell me a little bit -- I've read through the briefs, but if you could just give me a little bit of high level discussion of the store manager position insofar as it's revealed by discovery at this point.

Is there one store manager in each store?

MR. VALLI: Most of the time, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VALLI: There were three positions when we started the case. There were store managers. There was assistant store managers. There were comanagers. The assistant manager and comanager position were dependent upon which store was a union store or nonunion store. I think in the interim there was the Ibea case that I think -- I think Judge Gardephe had or maybe in Pennsylvania where Rite Aid has eliminated the exempt

assistant manager position. In 2009, they looked at the store manager position and decided, based upon store volume, they would create an exempt store manager position and a nonexempt store manager position. So but factually what you have is you have a situation where Rite Aid created a single national job description. In 2009, they created two job descriptions on a national level once again. The differences in the job description between exempt and nonexempt are virtually immaterial. So it's our position that they're viewing store managers as one homogeneous group. They did it in the beginning and then in the middle of litigation they did it again.

And if you look at the cases that the defendants cited -- each case seems to have a bit of evidence that leads to a decision by the district court to look at individual factors. For one instance, maybe you have a single job description but no real national evidence. Or maybe you don't have national evidence but you have deposition testimony.

In our case we have all of the evidence that warrants a granting of certification and a denial of their motion.

THE COURT: So what are the state law claims?

MR. VALLI: It's the New York labor law claims, your Honor. It's the overtime claims. It's a misclassification.

THE COURT: Do the New York labor law claims apply to out-of-state store managers?

times during the depositions the defendants would ask a store

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manager: Are you in charge? I'm in charge.

Well in thinking about it this weekend, I was watching my four-year-old nephew. He was driving one of those Playskool kind of cars. And it's got a steering wheel and it's got a shifter. And it's got mirrors. It's got a horn that actually works. It's got pedals. And if you ask my nephew: Are you driving the car? Oh, yeah, I'm driving the car. But my brother is behind him with a big aluminum pole controlling everything. And that's the situation you have at Rite Aid. And not to disparage the store managers, because I'm sure there are some of them, in a different context, who could actually manage the store.

THE COURT: You're saying they delusionally thought that they were in charge of the store?

MR. VALLI: Absolutely, Judge. They're not in charge of the store.

When you look at the type of command and control that Rite Aid has from the top down, they delineate virtually every aspect of a store -- of the store manager position from the portal system.

This is now testimony. Regardless of store location, size, volume, staffing, or any other variable, Rite Aid requires uniformity in all store operations. That's one of their district managers. That's exactly what we're saying.

Defendants have treated this group as a homogeneous

group. Their policies are nationwide. They disseminate them to all of the stores electronically. Their executives recognize that Rite Aid wants this to be one homogeneous group with no changes.

One of their other executives, in describing the portal system, which is how Rite Aid communicates with the stores and gives them all their information and all their instructions and all the rules they have to follow, portal guides district managers and store managers on virtually every aspect of the store functions and operations.

THE COURT: When you say portal guides, what does that mean?

MR. VALLI: Portal is what they call their -- their software. We could call it outlook. So they call it portal.

Portal -- I can give you a specific definition, your Honor.

Portal contains all the communication software, how the stores communicate with corporate, how corporate communicates with the stores, all the advertising that the stores are supposed to do. This is instructing them how to do it, all the store systems that are in place, all the routine processes that the stores have to engage in.

There's virtually no aspect of what a store manager does that involves independent control and discretion. It is all dictated.

So if you would ask a store manager: Do you hire and

fire? Well they may say yes. But in actuality: Oh, wait,

I've got to send that applicant to HR. HR has to approve that

applicant. And if you asked every store manager: Can you hire

someone without HR approval? Absolutely not. Can you fire

without approval? Absolutely not. Can you change your budget?

Absolutely not. Can you do overtime? Absolutely not. Can you

order -- you know, if you order something that's not on the

list? No. Can you set prices? No.

One of my favorite examples dealt with what's called an end cap. And this is when you walk into Rite Aid and you look in aisle one has cosmetics in every Rite Aid. And at the end of the aisle is an end cap. And it has a particular product. And that's going to be the product in virtually every store. Now it may be — it may change. Maybe you'll have suntan lotion in Miami and you'll have gloves and hats in Michigan. But it's the same for every store.

And now the store manager will say: Well, yeah, I designed that. In actuality, it came from corporate.

Corporate has a map, a diagram of every store. And it's telling that store: You will put this product here starting on this day, ending on this day. You will have ten units on the first shelf, eight units on the second shelf. And they have no control. And that's the point that we're making. So when you look at --

THE COURT: Well, I understand. To some extent this

is getting into the merits of the exempt issue. But I understand your point about -- your emphasize, for purposes of these motions, is the uniformity, commonality, etc.

MR. VALLI: As your Honor stated in the prior Jacob decision, there is no requirement that the store managers be identical, that the duties be identical. This is not a jigsaw puzzle that I have to put the pieces in, in the exact same framework that Rite Aid requires.

Classification at this level, as Myers said, and as the Court just reiterated in Cuevas, is inherently not an individual issue. It is a common class issue that should be decided on common class grounds. There is no other way to look at it.

THE COURT: Let me hear from defense counsel.

Mr. Turner, is that right?

MR. TURNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Turner, I wonder if -- you can start with any sort of general job background sort of stuff. But I wonder if you'd talk a little bit about, given what I wrote in the Duane Reade classification issue and putting aside whether I'm going to reconsider that, which I'm going -- I don't want you to assume anything about yet.

MR. TURNER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: How is this different?

MR. TURNER: Your Honor, this record is vastly

different in almost every possible way.

The evidence in this case is that contrary to the smoke and mirrors that you're hearing about all these policies — and I will give you specific names — there are store managers who testified: I don't need policies and I don't look at policies.

The portal that he's telling you about has only been in place since 2009 or 2008, in that timeframe. And all it does and what Rite Aid makes clear in its — in the corporate testimony is that they offer guidelines and best practices. There is no requirement that they — that the store managers follow those. And there's a reason for that. Rite Aid, unlike Duane Reade, and Rite Aid, unlike CVS, has grown over the years through many acquisitions. And there are different — for example, in the middle of this class, the Eckerd stores were acquired. They operated under the Eckerd banner for a year.

THE COURT: What's the word, Eckerd?

MR. TURNER: Eckerd, E-C-K-E-R-D.

They operated under the Eckerd banner for year and operated under Eckerd policies and then over time were changed over. But the testimony in this case is not even close to what plaintiffs wish it were. In reality, your Honor, I think that — here's where we are. We assert the executive, the administrative, and the combination exhibit. And we've provided evidence of all three of those in our briefing to your

Honor. They haven't addressed the administrative exemption or their combination exemption at all. I'll focus on the executive exemption which is where their focus has been. We know there is no dispute at all in this case that the salary basis test is satisfied. It's not an issue. We know that there is no dispute in this case that the store managers regularly directed the work of two or more employees; some testifying that — specifically, your Honor, store manager Rali supervised 70 employees. You have vastly different stores at Rite Aid, unlike the other chains. Grand Central Station. That store has 50, 60, 70, employees. Someone is running that store. And it is not a district manager.

THE COURT: Is there one person who is the store manager there?

MR. TURNER: That's correct, your Honor. That's my understanding. It's a 24-hour store so it's possible that there could be more than one. And contrary to what plaintiffs' counsel has said, there are now store managers who actually run multiple stores at once, especially lower volume stores. And they move around from store to store.

THE COURT: What's their salary?

MR. TURNER: The range, your Honor, the top range is around \$84,000 I believe. I don't know what the low range is because we haven't looked at this in some time and I -- please don't hold me to the 84. That's what I recall from some time

back.

THE COURT: Could you explain, while I'm thinking about it, I don't want to forget. What's the status of discovery? I think Judge Gardephe had this case before and I know there was a denial of summary judgment as to liability, saying there needed to be more facts. But has there since been discovery on liability issues?

MR. TURNER: Not -- it's been focused on class issues, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TURNER: To date, we've been limited to 50 depositions, which plaintiffs concede there was nothing about the methodology of picking them. They created a statistically sound model.

We were told 50. We were allowed to take 50 depositions.

We were even limited in New York. The only testimony you have on their Rule 23 New York claim is from six opt-ins. We noticed the depositions of six in Atlanta.

Keep in mind. Those individuals have affirmatively already asserted a claim against Rite Aid. Twenty percent of the people in New York who received the notice in the FLSA case opted in. There is testimony from four of the 80 percent who didn't opt-in, we submitted declarations, and they in turn deposed them. They obviously don't cite their testimony in any

of their charts or anything else. Those individuals testified at length about their managerial duties. My point being, there's nothing in this record that provides enough representative proof that would allow the Court to certify a Rule 23 action.

But what is in this record already, we know the following, your Honor, that — so, what I was going to say, as to the exemption, there really are only two issues. And these really are the questions that the Court should ask, is there a common answer: Whether the store managers' primary duty was the management of the store? That's one of the prongs. And then the second one is: Did they have the authority to hire, fire, or make recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, or promotion that were given particular weight.

As to hiring and firing. Here's what the testimony is. Store managers Blake, Hazara, Palumbo, Pletka and Rand always handled all aspects of the hiring process with no district manager or human resources oversight. That's the testimony that is in this record. And we've provided the citations for each of those to your Honor in the charts. They selected who to interview. They decided, once they — and then they conducted the interview. They decided who to hire. And then they completed the hiring process after making an offer, with no one else involved.

Store manager Indergit testified that from up until

2006 he had the exact same authority at all times. No oversight by anyone. After 2006 he had to -- he went through the entire process, and then he would recommend to his district manager, Mr. Offor whether or not -- or seek -- he would recommend this one be hired. He never once had Mr. Offor say no. Every recommendation he made was accepted.

We also know, your Honor, that store managers Gerber and Santos always had to seek district manager and human resources approval.

We also know that store managers Goodloe and Smith never hired anyone. They weren't involved in the process at all.

We know that store manager Lembezeder, he didn't hire anybody either. Why? He delegated it to his assistant manager and let his assistant manager do all of the hiring. And then he wasn't involved at all. Doesn't mean he didn't have the authority. He gave the authority away.

We also know that store manager McGillivray assisted with the pharmacy hiring; whereas, store manager Lembezeder and Smith -- or managers Lembezeder and Smith did not do so.

We know store manager Hazara set the pay rate for people she hired. That's her testimony.

We also know that store managers Spencer and Simons did not because they had collective bargaining agreements that did it for them.

The record is all over the board.

So if we just look at the two common questions that really you should be looking can you answer those questions:

Could they hire? It depends. And it depends dramatically from yes, no, to everything in between. That's what this record demonstrates.

The allegations of corporate control are the same thing. The job description, the testimony is all over the board.

Plaintiff Indergit -- may we approach? We've got some job descriptions we asked them to markup during their depositions to show if they -- may we?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. TURNER: I'll let Ms. Moeller so I can keep talking, if that's okay with your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. TURNER: Plaintiff Indergit testified during his deposition that his primary duty was to -- was managing the total store operations and that the job description defined his position.

We know that store managers -- let me get my notes, your Honor, I'm sorry -- we know that store managers Martin and Echeverria dispute that the job description defined their positions.

And importantly, your Honor, you asked me why this

case is different from Duane Reade. Well it's different because of its first line managers and there's nobody in the store overseeing them on a daily basis like the assistant managers. It's different because Rite Aid's testimony in this case, the 30(b)(6) testimony in this case is we don't require the store managers to follow guidelines and we don't take the position that the job description defines the position.

In Jacob, the Court stated DR asserts that the assistant manager job description accurately denotes the assistant managers's duties, responsibilities, and expectations.

In Demassia v. Duane Reade, Duane Reade affirmatively conceded that it had uniform business practices and the job duties and responsibilities of all assistant store managers were centrally derived

In this case, Rite Aid's position is we don't standardize things in our stores. We look for best practices and we provide best practices to our stores on different activities. But we don't dictate how they do any particular activity. And that's Tony Sadler, who is the executive vice-president of operations and was the witness for the company in this case.

Are there district managers out there who micromanage?

Absolutely. If you look at the testimony we provided to your

Honor -- and again I can go through and give you names of

people.

District manager Indergit testified that his district manager did not run his store. He ran his store. Definitively he testified to that.

District Managers Enser and Keane say it depended on the district manager.

Some were completely off -- completely hands-off and not involved. Some micromanaged them

District Manager Lembezeder, he claimed that a district manager who visited his store bimonthly ran his \$12-million-a-year store.

It's all over the board as to any factor that's identified as being part of the primary duty.

Here's the kicker. On the issue of primary duty.

Even if we assume that the job description accurately defines the primary duty of the store managers, as the Court indicated, along with policies and procedures in the Duane Reade case, in this case we know that doesn't end the question.

The summary judgment order in this case, despite

Mr. Indergit's testimony, my primary duty was total

operations — managing the total operations of the store.

Despite that admission, the summary judgment order in the case says that's not enough. You have to look behind that. You have to look at the percentage of time that he spent performing nonmanagerial duties. You have to look at concurrent duties.

How do you do that? You have to get testimony from other people who worked with him, from the supervisor. You have to get testimony from his coworkers. You have to get testimony from his subordinates.

That's the only way you're going to know, according to the law of this case.

That analysis applies to every one of the store managers and particularly in light of the evidence that we have demonstrating vast, vastly conflicting testimony as to what they did or did not do.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Did you want to reply to anything?

MR. VALLI: Absolutely.

THE COURT: You don't need to. I think that answers the questions I have but if there's anything you would like to add you may.

MR. VALLI: I would draw your attention to Exhibit A your Honor which is in our opposition to their motion for decertification which is oddly enough our version of a rigorous analysis by going through all the testimony and providing it for your Honor.

And at the primary -- with respect to the primary duties, as you stated in Jacobs, the vast majority of these individuals all testified to having the very same duties. And the level of control exhibited by Rite Aid over these

individuals, despite what counsel has said, is there.

Everyone testified these are national policies distributed on a national level. I don't recall anyone saying that store managers can violate policy and not be held accountable. I don't believe that's the actual case.

With respect to best practices, your Honor, we didn't even discuss that. But what Rite Aid has done is now they've created a system whereby how you take a product out of a bin and place it on the shelf was analyzed. They timed it. They figured out how many times that takes place in each store. And they calculated a labor budget based upon that. They then held each store to that labor budget. Store managers had no input in that. The district managers had virtually no input in that. So, to say the store managers have this level of control is just not accurate.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TURNER: May I? Very briefly.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. TURNER: There -- I believe that the correct number. There are somewhere -- we estimate around fifteen hundred class members as opposed to a hundred and something.

But I believe Mr. Valli, that's what I understood him to say.

MR. VALLI: In New York. Just in New York.

MR. TURNER: What he was talking about was the number of opt-ins in his case here in New York. We're talking about a

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vastly different number of store managers, almost none of which do we have testimony from those who haven't actually affirmatively asserted a claim.

THE COURT: So the number of class members.

MR. TURNER: Just in New York.

THE COURT: In New York is what?

MR. TURNER: We think it's somewhere around fifteen hundred. We'd have to -- there could be some -- we had them pull the numbers, and there could be some overlap. It goes by job code. People could come in and out.

The number they actually polled was closer to seventeen. But it's probably better to say it's around fifteen is our best guess.

THE COURT: That's assuming you go back six years under the New York statute of limitations?

MR. TURNER: From this point it's actually level years.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. TURNER: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TURNER: And your Honor I would -- if I may, at the end of the day despite -- regardless whether there could possibly be any common answers, the individual issues -- setting aside just damages -- but the individual issues -- and I'm happy to talk to your Honor about terminations, but there

are store managers who testified they terminated people on the spot with nobody involved, and they did it throughout their career. Some had the ability to do it within 90 days of hiring somebody without anyone involved. Mr. Indergit, it depended on the timeframe. Up until 2006 he could do it whenever he wanted to.

Just as to the single issue of whether or not they had the ability to hire and fire, there is no common answer. But even if you could conclude that there somehow is, the individual issues will swamp any common answer as to whether they could or couldn't because they say they can.

But I'll also point out -- do you want to hear from us on Comcast at all?

THE COURT: If you'd like to add anything you may but I've received your letters.

MR. TURNER: There's two things that I don't think are very clear in our letter that I think we would like to point out to your Honor.

The number of hours we're talking about here -- and I've looked at the Duane Reade briefing -- vastly different. The range of hours according to their clients who are actually opt-ins in the FSLA case is 45 to 90 hours. That's more than a work week. There is no way -- what I think the Supreme Court is saying is you have to come up with something other than speculation, a just and reasonable inference.

There is no just and reasonable inference that either, A, for a store manager who is testifying in the record, a store manager who only worked 20 to 25 hours a week or a store manager testifying she knew one, then that person gets a huge windfall if you try to come up with some middle line. The person who worked 90, unless you go to 90 for everybody, which can't be right, they suddenly get — their due process rights are violated. They're giving up a lot of money. It's hundreds of thousands of dollars potentially.

The second thing, your Honor, is in this case we have correspondence from plaintiffs' counsel on the issue of damages where they stated in their correspondence to us, when they were asking for damages information as to all of the opt-ins, I believe was the controversy at the time. We said no, you've asked for a sampling; focus on the sampling and demonstrate damages based on that. They said, the response, "Damages is not a representation issue."

We agree. Wholeheartedly. You can't prove that. You can't prove damages based on representational proof in this case. And many trials or anything else isn't going to solve that because of the severe range. It's not 45 to 60, or 45 to 55 which seems to be the assistant manager case. Ours is vastly different.

THE COURT: But is there a uniform database or recordkeeping mechanism that has the hours?

MR. TURNER: No, your Honor. There is no such thing.

Unlike with Duane Reade, I understood them to say today -- and I don't know their record and I don't work for that company -- what I understood them to say today is that there are punch records.

There is no such thing for us.

Depending on the timeframe and the store they worked in, what are called core Rite Aid stores, like the original Rite Aid stores. When they come in, they key in, in the computer. That just records their presence. There is no keying out. There's nothing to indicate how much time they worked. It doesn't exist.

In Eckerd stores there was never anything. Eckerd did not keep it. And when they transitioned over to Rite Aid, the computer systems didn't gel at all. So there isn't even the original punch time when they come in.

So it's vastly different in this case than what Duane Reade was describing.

THE COURT: Wouldn't it be an odd incentive though if the absence of records by the employer freed them from having to deal with Rule 23 class actions?

MR. TURNER: I don't -- no, your Honor. I don't think so. Especially, again, you're dealing with store managers. I mean some of them are running stores that are 10, 20 million dollar stores. And there isn't any understanding by the

company. The company believes -- the company continues to believe that they are properly classified.

The reclassification issue that they brought up had nothing to do with this lawsuit. The company was bleeding money. I don't know if you're familiar with Rite Aid, but it was on the verge of bankruptcy. And they stirred up operations. And they changed the way they ran their low volume stores. And as a good corporate citizen, they stopped and looked, and said okay are they going to have enough hours to supervise? That's the question. And it was close.

THE COURT: What do you mean? Are they going to have enough hours --

MR. TURNER: They have to regularly direct two or more employees, which means they have to be supervising up to 80 hours.

So they dramatically changed the way those stores run and said to the store managers you're going to be in the store alone, which wasn't the case before. And so we're going to change the way that we pay you.

It wasn't an issue of they just made a change. They were trying to make the company profitable again.

THE COURT: Aren't some of the store managers classified as nonexempt?

MR. TURNER: That's correct, your Honor. As of 2009 there are some store managers -- again, so the common

classification issue depends on the timeframe.

As of 2009, the ones I was just talking about in those low volume stores, there were huge operational changes. The number of times trucks come, the way that product was put out on the floor. They changed a lot. And they said we need to make these people nonexempt.

THE COURT: As to them, they are keeping records, time records?

MR. TURNER: Of course. And they are paid overtime.

Did you want to reply to anything on that last point?

THE COURT: And they're?

MR. TURNER: They're paid overtime if they work more than 40 hours.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. VALLI: Just your point, your Honor, which is obviously when they made this change in classifications they did so on store volume. They didn't look at any individual issue regarding any particular store manager.

I mean as you've noted, it is an odd incentive for an employer to say we're not going to keep track of your records, employee, and you won't be able to bring a class action. But they did punch in. And they were instructed don't punch out. So we have evidence of that. So we think it was an affirmative step by Rite Aid to prevent the employees from knowing how many hours they worked.

In New York state, that's not a particularly difficult issue because New York state permits an employee to testify as to the hours that they worked. It is black letter law. It has been black letter law for I think -- I want to go back almost 45 years. Judge Gardephe just set forth the same reasoning in a bench trial that he had a few years ago. So I'm not too concerned about that.

And one of the other differences from Duane Reade is that store managers in Rite Aid were required to work 50 hours a week or more. So we have a floor.

And obviously the calculation that's used by the federal department of labor is probably sufficient for this case, which is we take the number of hours that you worked, we divide it into your weekly pay, we come up with your weekly hourly rate, multiple it by — we get 1.5, multiple it by all hours over 40. It's very straighted forward, very simple, and it happens everyday in every wage—an—hour case.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. TURNER: Any chance I can address the 50 hours?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. TURNER: Not true. There were -- at times there were expectations of 50 hours. But the store managers' testimony is across the board as to whether they did it or not. And the record shows that.

Mr. Valli referenced an Exhibit A to their brief where

they showed testimony. If you'll look, your Honor, when you get a chance, which would have been attachment 8 or exhibit 8 to my declaration in the reply to motion, to their — to their — to our motion for decertification, this was their chart. This is our chart that's created from their chart.

What it shows is there is not a single store manager that they cite that is consistent across the categories they claim are common. Not one. And, in fact, they don't even cite four -- I mean seven of the store managers who were deposed. Why? Because they don't support any of the claims. It's just not even close to being the case.

Given the testimony in this case that's demonstrated by our charts and even just hiring and termination alone where it's across the board, your Honor, how are we going to try this case as a class action? How is it even possible to get there?

The range of nonmanagerial work as it relates to primary duty alone is 20 percent to 90 percent. Hiring is yes, I did with nobody involved to no I didn't. In every possible direction. You've got so many — so much conflicting evidence. How is it possible to try this case on a collective basis or a class basis, either one?

THE COURT: All right. Thank you folks very much. (Adjourned)